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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early days of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 the
Supreme Court of Canada has applied a two-stage framework to determine whether
legislation complies with the Charter. The ﬁrst stage considers whether the
legislation infringes a right or freedom.2 The second determines whether the
infringement is demonstrably justiﬁed.3 In Frank v. Canada (Attorney General),4
the dissenting opinion of Côté and Brown JJ. rejects this framework and formulates
an alternative. Their central claim is that the Charter does not justify the
infringement of the rights that it elaborates. Accordingly, instead of focusing on
whether an infringement is justiﬁed, courts should focus on whether the limit that
shapes the “right’s outer boundaries” is justiﬁed.5 A limit that is justiﬁed does not
*
Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. I am grateful to Ben Ewing, Colin Grey, John
Martin Gillroy, Sabine Tsuruda and Grégoire Webber for comments on an earlier draft.
Alysha Flipse, Oliver Flis, Aicha-Raeburn Cherradi and Luke Sabourin provided outstanding
research assistance. This research was supported by an Insight Development Grant awarded
by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
1

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.); Singh v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R.
177 (S.C.C.); R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).
I will use the term “rights” as encompassing both rights and freedoms.
3

R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).

4

[2019] S.C.J. No. 1, 2019 SCC 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Frank”].

5

Frank, at para. 120.
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infringe a right. A limit that infringes a right cannot be justiﬁed.
Chief Justice Wagner’s majority opinion acknowledges the novelty of the
dissent’s proposal,6 but gives it short shrift. He does not respond to the dissent’s
textual argument that the wording of section 1 authorizes the justiﬁcation of limits
rather than infringements. He characterizes the dissent’s proposal as “largely
semantic in nature, driven by a disagreement” about whether an infringement refers
to a limit that demands justiﬁcation or a limit that is unjustiﬁed.7 Nor does he engage
with the dissent’s normative claim that its proposal transcends “mere semantics” by
clarifying “our understanding of rights and of the legitimate boundaries of state
action”.8 After observing that the dissent’s proposal departs “from decades of
Charter jurisprudence, was neither raised nor argued at any stage of these
proceedings and, above all, need not be considered in order to dispose of this
appeal”, Chief Justice Wagner “decline[s] to discuss the merits of their position on
this point”.9
The purpose of this essay is to assess the merits of the Frank dissent’s proposal.
I begin by considering the dissent’s textual argument that its approach alone coheres
with the language of “s. 1 itself”.10 This argument fails because the dissent’s claims
about section 1 are inconclusive and commit it to ignoring constitutional text
pertaining to infringements that appears in section 24. I then assess the dissent’s
normative argument that its proposal would enhance the quality of rights-protection
under the Charter. When the ramiﬁcations of the proposal are unpacked, the rhetoric
does not match the reality. Under the prevailing Charter framework, rightsprotection is rooted in two ideas. The ﬁrst is that rights are constitutional standards
to which legislation must conform. Accordingly, legislation that is inconsistent with
these standards is presumptively unconstitutional.11 The second is that rebutting this
presumption requires a special justiﬁcation demonstrating that the loss to the
constitutional right is offset by a proportional gain to a competing constitutional
principle.12 The Frank dissent’s proposal abandons these ideas. On the one hand, the
dissent conceives of rights not as constitutional standards that bind legislative
bodies, but as policies established through legislative choice. On the other, the
dissent insists that these policies must be justiﬁed under section 1, but defends a
notion of justiﬁcation that proceeds on the basis that the limit of the right must be
understood as a policy choice to which courts must show deference. Taking these
strands together, in the dissent’s framework legislative choices are constrained by
6

Frank, at para. 40.

7

Frank, at para. 40.

8

Frank, at para. 122.

9

Frank, at para. 41.

10

Frank, at para. 120.

11

R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at para. 63 (S.C.C.).

12

R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at para. 64 (S.C.C.).
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neither broad Charter rights nor the imperative to justify limitations. While this
framework denies that rights may be infringed, it affords individuals no more
protection than legislative bodies happen to impart.
Frank considers whether Parliament may deny Canadians who have resided
outside Canada for more than ﬁve consecutive years of eligibility to vote in federal
elections. The Canada Elections Act deﬁnes an elector as a citizen “who on polling
day is 18 years of age or older”.13 Electors may cast their ballots in person at a
polling station of the “polling division in which he or she is ordinarily resident”.14
Citizens who do not reside in Canada may vote “by means of a special ballot”.15
However, citizens who have resided outside Canada for more than ﬁve consecutive
years are ineligible to vote unless they fall under one of the exemptions found in
section 11.16 For these citizens, residency in Canada is required to restore voting
eligibility. The claimants in Frank are Canadian citizens who pursued university
study in the United States. Subsequently, both claimants sought employment related
to their respective ﬁelds in Canada, without success, but would return if suitable
employment was available.17 They challenge the residency requirement on the
grounds that it is an unjustiﬁed infringement of section 3 of the Charter: “Every
citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of
Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualiﬁed for membership
therein.”18
Propelled by diverging approaches, the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada
embrace opposing conclusions. Chief Justice Wagner’s majority opinion and Rowe
J.’s concurrence apply the prevailing Charter framework. After observing that the
Attorney General of Canada conceded that the residency requirement in the Canada
Elections Act infringes the right to vote,19 the majority and the concurrence ﬁnd the
infringement to be unjustiﬁed. In contrast, the dissent maintains that the Attorney
13

S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 3.

14

Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 6.

15

Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 127(c).

16

Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 11. The exemption applies to “(a) a Canadian
Forces elector; (b) an elector who is an employee in the federal public administration or the
public service of a province and who is posted outside Canada; (c) a Canadian citizen who
is employed by an international organization of which Canada is a member and to which
Canada contributes and who is posted outside Canada; (d) a person who has been absent from
Canada for less than ﬁve consecutive years and who intends to return to Canada as a
resident; (e) an incarcerated elector within the meaning of that Part; and (f) any other elector
in Canada who wishes to vote in accordance with that Part” [emphasis added].
17
Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] O.J. No. 2098, 2014 ONSC 907, at paras.
13, 17 (Ont. S.C.J.).
18

Charter, s. 3.

19

Frank, at para. 4, Wagner C.J.C., and at para. 84, Rowe J., concurring.
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General of Canada made an “analytical error by conceding an ‘infringement’”.20
The residency requirement limits the right by shaping its “boundaries and contours”,21 but the right to vote is not infringed because the limit is justiﬁed.
II. SELECTIVE TEXTUALISM
The dissent maintains that a “textually faithful account of s. 1” would focus on
whether a limit is justiﬁed, not on whether an infringement is justiﬁed.22 This
interpretation encounters two difficulties. First, the text of section 1 does not indicate
that the word limits bears the distinctive meaning the dissent attributes to it. Second,
the dissent’s interpretation of section 1 requires it to ignore the wording of section
24, a constitutional provision that sheds light on the permissibility of infringements
under the Charter.
The dissent’s textual argument proceeds from the following observation: “[T]he
text of s. 1 itself . . . speaks not of reasonable and demonstrably justiﬁable
infringements, but of reasonable and demonstrably justiﬁable limits.”23 Consider the
text of section 1: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justiﬁed in a free and democratic society.”24 Accordingly, the dissent rejects the view that section 1 offers government the opportunity
to restrict the protections that rights afford by justifying infringements. Instead, the
dissent insists that section 1 offers government the opportunity to justify the way in
which legislation limits the right by specifying the “right’s outer boundaries”.25
The Frank dissent is correct that the text of section 1 refers to limits. But what is
the meaning of that term? One possibility is that limits refer, as the dissent insists,
to “the right’s outer boundaries”.26 Thus, we might speak of violent acts as falling
beyond the “limits to the ambit of freedom of expression”.27 Another possibility is
that limits refer not to the boundary of a thing, but to a restriction or constraint on
an instance of a thing.28 Thus, the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
indicate that the “term ‘limitations’ in these principles includes the term ‘restric20

Frank, at para. 123.

21

Frank, at para. 124.

22

Frank, at para. 121.

23

Frank, at para. 120 [emphasis in original].

24

Charter, s. 1 [emphasis added].

25

Frank, at para. 120.

26

Frank, at para. 120.

27

B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995]
1 S.C.R. 315, at para. 226 (S.C.C.), Iacobucci and Major JJ., concurring.
28

John Simpson & Edmund Weiner, Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989), sub verbo “limit”.
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tions’ as used in the Covenant”.29 In turn, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights refers to the right to free expression, association and assembly as
being subject to “restrictions” that are prescribed by law and necessary to achieve
certain enumerated objectives.30 For example, although political discourse is
protected by the guarantee of free expression, “it may be legitimate for a State party
to restrict political polling imminently preceding an election in order to maintain the
integrity of the electoral process”.31 Here, a limitation refers not to the boundary of
a right, but to an infringement or restriction on what lies within its bounds.
The dissent’s textual argument is inconclusive because the term limits is open to
multiple interpretations. The text of section 1 of the Charter does not indicate
whether limits refers to a boundary that may not be transgressed or to a restriction
of that which lies within a boundary. While the dissent prefers the former meaning,
it offers no textual argument to exclude the latter. Accordingly, the dissent’s claim
that its approach alone adheres to the text of section 1 lacks textual support.
If the text of section 1 does not indicate the meaning of the word limits, perhaps
other provisions of the Charter can shed light on this term. Justice Lamer (as he then
was) once remarked: “Our constitutional Charter must be construed as a system
where ‘[e]very component contributes to the meaning as a whole, and the whole
gives meaning to its parts. . .’ The court must interpret each section of the Charter
in relation to the others.”32 Accordingly, we must ask whether other provisions of
the Charter support or subvert the dissent’s proposal.
Having asserted that the Charter does not authorize the justiﬁcation of infringements, it is striking that the dissent does not consider the provision of the Charter
that explicitly refers to infringements:
24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been
infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such
remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by
this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard
29

Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York: American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, April 1985).
30

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, arts. 19, 21-22 (entered into force March 23, 1976, accession by Canada May
19, 1976).
31

General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UNHRC,
102nd Sess., CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011), at para. 37.
32

R. v. Dubois, [1985] S.C.J. No. 69, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350, at 365 (S.C.C.), quoting P.A.
Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 1984), at
236.
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to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.33

Each subsection of section 24 refers to rights and freedoms that have been infringed.
And each time, the word infringed is accompanied by the word denied. From the
standpoint of the dissent’s proposal, the coupling of these words is mysterious. On
the dissent’s view, the limitation of a right can be justiﬁed, but the infringement —
or, what amounts to the same thing — the denial, or violation of a right cannot be.
Using the terms infringement and violation interchangeably, the dissent writes: “It
distorts our constitutional discourse, and our understanding of rights and of the
legitimate boundaries of state action, to speak of individuals having rights which
may be justiﬁably violated by the state.”34 From the dissent’s standpoint, infringement, violation and denial are equivalent terms for referring to limitations that
cannot be justiﬁed under section 1. This interpretative stance generates a textual
difficulty because both provisions in section 24 of the Charter refer to rights or
freedoms that have been “infringed or denied”.35 By maintaining that these terms
are synonymous, the dissent commits itself to the view that the Constitution’s
meaning would remain unchanged if either of these terms was omitted. Having
argued that their approach alone is faithful to the text of the Charter, the dissenters
fail to observe that their approach renders constitutional text that appears in both
subsections of section 24 meaningless.36
In the early days of the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada offered a
framework that gave independent meaning to infringements and denials. In Big M,
Dickson J. (as he then was) rejected the government’s attempt to justify the Lord’s
Day Act37 on the basis of “convenience and expediency” as “fundamentally
repugnant because it would justify the law upon the very basis upon which it is
attacked for violating s. 2(a)”.38 Justiﬁcation is possible only where the infringement’s “aims and objectives . . . are consonant with the guarantees enshrined in the
Charter”.39 In contrast, where such aims and objectives are absent, the right is not
subject to an infringement, which might be justiﬁed, but to a “total negation”.40
33

Charter, s. 24 [emphasis added].

34

Frank, at para. 122 [emphasis added].

35

Charter, s. 24.

36

R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 179 (S.C.C.) (Wilson J.
writing that constitutional text “should not be treated as tautologous if capable of
independent, although related, meaning”).
37

R.S.C. 1970, c. L-13.

38

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 140
(S.C.C.).
39

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 81
(S.C.C.).
40

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 84
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Justice Dickson illustrated the idea of a negation by pointing to a hypothetical drawn
from the Supreme Court’s ﬁrst Charter case:
An Act of Parliament or of a legislature which, for example, purported to impose
the beliefs of a State religion would be in direct conﬂict with s. 2(a) of the Charter,
which guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, and would have to be ruled
of no force or effect without the necessity of even considering whether such
legislation could be legitimized by s. 1.41

On Dickson J.’s view, infringements and denials are different in kind. An
infringement restricts a right for the sake of a principle consonant with Charter
guarantees and is therefore susceptible to section 1 justiﬁcation. In contrast, a denial
restricts a right for the sake of an objective that is antithetical to Charter guarantees
and is therefore invalid unless temporarily authorized by the override provision or
permanently authorized by a constitutional amendment.42 While Dickson J. did not
root this distinction in the text of section 24, he offers an explanation of how the
terms infringed or denied that appear repeatedly within it can be given independent
meaning.
The distinction between limits and denials can be formulated in terms of the
terminology found in R. v. Oakes.43 Infringements are susceptible to justiﬁcation
because they restrict a right in order to advance a pressing and substantial objective.
In contrast, a denial violates a right for the sake of “objectives which are trivial or
discordant with the principles integral to a free and democratic society”.44 Trivial
objectives include legislative or administrative convenience45 and non-prohibitive
cost.46 Discordant objectives, such as objectives that are discriminatory, are directly
opposed to rights guarantees.47 Objectives incapable of justifying the limitation of
(S.C.C.). On the limit-denial distinction in the context of s. 35, see McLachlin J. (dissenting)
in R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at para. 306 (S.C.C.).
41

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 84
(S.C.C.), citing Quebec (Attorney General) v. Quebec Assn. of Protestant School Boards,
[1984] S.C.J. No. 31, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66 (S.C.C.).
42

Quebec (Attorney General) v. Quebec Assn. of Protestant School Boards, [1984] S.C.J.
No. 31, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, at 86 (S.C.C.).
43

[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).

44

R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at para. 69 (S.C.C.).

45

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 140
(S.C.C.); Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at para. 70 (S.C.C.).
46
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at para. 73 (S.C.C.). But see Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v.
Newfoundland and Labrador Assn. of Public and Private Employees, [2004] S.C.J. No. 61,
2004 SCC 66 (S.C.C.).
47

Rosenberg v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] O.J. No. 1627, 158 D.L.R. (4th) 664
(Ont. C.A.).
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a Charter right “do not gain s. 1 protection”.48
On this interpretation of subsection 24(1), courts are to provide Charter remedies
to individuals in two kinds of cases. In the ﬁrst, a right is infringed and the ensuing
justiﬁcation fails. In the second, a right is denied and no justiﬁcation is available.
This interpretation of subsection 24(1) does not require the court to grant a remedy
where an infringement is “demonstrably justiﬁed”.49 After all, the text of subsection
24(1) stipulates that a court must provide “such remedy as the court considers
appropriate and just in the circumstances”.50 Where the infringement is itself
appropriate and just, there is nothing to remedy. Thus, subsection 24(1) requires
courts to remedy infringements that are unjustiﬁed and denials that are unjustiﬁable.
The dissent’s statement that “there is no good reason for . . . ignor[ing]
constitutional text” is fatal to its own argument.51 By maintaining that infringements
cannot be justiﬁed under section 1, the dissent advances an interpretation of section
1 that requires ignoring constitutional text that appears in both subsections of section
24. Its claim to textual ﬁdelity therefore dissolves. In contrast, the prevailing Charter
paradigm, in which limits refer to infringements, does not generate this difficulty. In
section 1, the government may seek to justify infringements, not denials. Section 24
requires the court to extend remedies for infringements in which justiﬁcation is
inadequate and for denials in which justiﬁcation is impossible. Such an interpretive
approach coheres to the text of both subsections of section 24 of the Charter.
Although the dissent’s textual argument fails, its normative argument remains.
For the dissenters, rights-protection would be enhanced if Canadian courts rejected
the possibility of justifying infringements on Charter rights. If this argument is
correct, those who seek to enhance rights-protection under the Charter might regard
the prevailing paradigm and the constitutional text from which it issues with some
regret. This would be unwarranted. When the ramiﬁcations of the dissent’s proposal
are unpacked, it delivers no more protection than legislative bodies happen to grant.
In the sections that follow, I unpack the ramiﬁcations of the dissent’s proposal for
rights and justiﬁed limits in turn.
III. SPECIFYING RIGHTS
Constitutional rights are often formulated in the language of “majestic generalities”.52 If such generalities are to extend concrete protections to their bearers, a
framework is needed for determining what falls within the scope of a right. In
Charter jurisprudence, that framework is purposive interpretation.53 The dissent
48

R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at para. 69 (S.C.C.).

49

Charter, s. 1.

50

Charter, s. 24(1).

51

Frank, at para. 122.

52

Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, at 282 (1947), Jackson J.

53

Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 156 (S.C.C.); R.
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neither refers to purposive interpretation nor to the purpose of the right to vote.
Instead, it invokes the idea of “legislative speciﬁcation”.54 This section explores
what the dissent means by this term. I argue that while there is a conception of
legislative speciﬁcation that accords with purposive interpretation, this is not the
conception that the dissent affirms. On the purposive view, a constitutional right
protects its bearers by requiring legislation to conform to the right’s underlying
purpose (or purposes). Legislation that is inconsistent with that purpose breaches the
right. In contrast, on the dissent’s view, the scope of a broad Charter right is the
product of legislation. The right therefore offers its bearer no protection from
legislation. If the Charter offers any protections at all, that protection comes not
from rights, but from some other constitutional source, such as the justiﬁcation
analysis.
The guiding idea of purposive interpretation is that the protections that a right
affords are to be determined in reference to that right’s purpose.55 As Dickson J. put
the point in Big M: “The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter
was to be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it was to
be understood, in other words, in the light of the interests it was meant to protect.”56
Purposive interpretation proceeds by identifying the purpose of the constitutional
text as a whole, formulating the purpose of each of the provisions within this whole,
and, ﬁnally, determining how the purpose of the relevant provision can be fulﬁlled
in a given context. In Hunter v. Southam Inc., Dickson J. characterized the purpose
of a constitution as a “continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of
governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the
unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties”.57 Within this framework,
the scope of a particular right is determined in light of its purpose. For example, in
Big M, he interpreted the right to freedom of conscience and religion in subsection
2(a) of the Charter as protecting the freedom of an individual to “hold and to
manifest whatever beliefs and opinions his or her conscience dictates”.58 Because
the Lord’s Day Act empowered government to “coerce individuals to manifest a
speciﬁc religious practice for a sectarian purpose”, the Act stood in diametric
opposition to the purpose of subsection 2(a). Thus, Dickson J. concluded that the Act
was inconsistent with subsection 2(a).
v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 116 (S.C.C.).
54

Frank, at paras. 113-114, 124.

55

Dieter Grimm, “The Basic Law at 60 – Identity and Change” (2010) 11:1 German L.J.
33, at 44. See also Jacob Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity: The Theory and Practice of
Modern Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), at 218-21.
56

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 116
(S.C.C.) [emphasis in original].
57

[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155 (S.C.C.).

58

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 123
(S.C.C.).
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The Frank majority follows the purposive approach. Chief Justice Wagner
observes that the majority opinion in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Offıcer)59
“stressed the critical importance of a broad and purposive interpretation of the right
to vote”.60 After referring to the broad wording of section 3, Wagner C.J.C. explains
that the “central purpose of s. 3 is to ensure the right of each citizen to participate
meaningfully in the electoral process”.61 This right is essential to democracy, a form
of government in which each citizen has “a genuine opportunity to participate in the
governance of the country through the electoral process”.62 Since the Canada
Election Act’s residency requirement excludes Canadian citizens who have resided
outside Canada for ﬁve consecutive years from meaningful participation in the
electoral process, the requirement infringes section 3 of the Charter.63
The dissent’s analysis of the right to vote neither invokes the idea of purposive
interpretation nor the purpose of the right to vote. Instead, its organizing idea is
legislative speciﬁcation:
We start from the premise that s. 3 is a positive right which, unlike most Charter
rights, requires legislative speciﬁcation in order for the right to be operative. It
follows that Parliament acted to deﬁne and shape the boundaries and contours of a
positive entitlement which, as such, necessarily requires legislative speciﬁcation.64
[T]he right to vote is a positive entitlement. It is therefore, at least in part, a
necessarily legislated right. Meaning, it is “given form and content in legislation”
which speciﬁes “the distinctions on which the general affirmation is silent” . . ..
Such legislation . . . breathes life into the right so that it may be recognized and
exercised.65

In what follows, I explain that the idea of legislative speciﬁcation could be
committed to purposive interpretation or opposed to it. My claim here is twofold.
First, the conception that opposes purposive interpretation abandons the simple idea
that individuals can constrain the conduct of their government through their rights.
Second, this is the conception that the dissent adopts.
There is a notion of legislative speciﬁcation that is consistent with purposive
interpretation. Consider how Dieter Grimm distinguishes between the kinds of
duties imposed by the negative and positive dimensions of a constitutional right. The
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negative aspect “requires the state to abstain from certain actions. Consequently,
there is only one way to comply with this duty, namely, to omit acts violating
fundamental rights”.66 In contrast, the positive aspect of a fundamental right
requires not forbearance but state action. Because the Constitution does not indicate
how the positive aspect is to be fulﬁlled, the “duty can be fulﬁlled in various
ways”.67 The role of legislation is to “lend concrete form” to the right by
determining the particular scheme through which its broad purpose will be
fulﬁlled.68 Because this view demands legislative conformity to the right’s purpose,
I will refer to it as the purposive view of legislative speciﬁcation.
On the purposive view, positive rights impose two constraints on legislative
bodies. The ﬁrst is that wherever a positive right is present, the legislature enjoys no
discretion to refrain from acting. The second constraint concerns the kind of
legislative action that a positive right demands. Legislative speciﬁcation must fulﬁll
the purpose of the right. Thus, a positive right is infringed by both legislative
inaction and legislative action that fails to secure the right’s purpose. Taking these
constraints together, the right to vote requires a legislative scheme that fulﬁlls the
purpose of the right by enabling citizens to meaningfully participate in democratic
life.
There is an opposing understanding of legislative speciﬁcation. Its fundamental
idea is that rights are indeterminate. Accordingly, reasonable disagreements arise in
response to questions about the protections that rights afford.69 Because rights
generate disputes that cannot be “fully settled by reason”,70 an agent is required to
establish what rights demand. For democratic reasons, this agent must be the
legislature.71 Given the indeterminacy of rights, “the legislature is not best
understood as infringing” rights, but “seeking to specify the scope and content” of
rights.72 For example, in an area prone to earthquakes, a legislative body might
66
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specify the scope of the right to life by enacting building codes that set out
requirements concerning soil, building height, weight, use, and so forth. The
resulting legislation plays a meaningful role in securing the right to life.73 This
conception of legislative speciﬁcation is associated with the constitutional theory of
Grégoire Webber, Richard Ekins and Bradley Miller, among others.74
This view of legislative speciﬁcation involves both an uncontroversial and a
radical claim about constitutional rights. The uncontroversial claim is that certain
rights claims can be secured only through detailed legislation.75 That much is
common ground with the purposive view. The radical claim is that the scope of a
constitutional right is determined though a legislative choice. Whereas the purposive
view of legislative speciﬁcation rejects this claim, what I call the radical view
accepts it.
The radical view of legislative speciﬁcation breaks from its purposive counterpart
in two respects.
The ﬁrst concerns the kinds of claims to which each view applies. On the
purposive view, the positive dimension of a constitutional right alone requires
legislative speciﬁcation. In the case of a broadly formulated positive right, different
administrative schemes are capable of fulﬁlling its demands. A negative right does
not require legislative speciﬁcation because the restraint that its purpose demands is
the sole means of the right’s fulﬁllment. In contrast, on the radical view, the
distinction between positive and negative rights plays no role. Legislative speciﬁcation is required not because the underlying purpose of a positive right can be
satisﬁed through different schemes, but because open-ended rights are subject to
disputes that reason generates but is powerless to resolve. All broadly formulated
rights, regardless of whether they impose positive or negative duties, demand
legislative speciﬁcation.76
A further divergence concerns the constitutional parameters in which legislative
speciﬁcation is to occur. The purposive view maintains that the role of legislative
Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 1, at 11.
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speciﬁcation is to fulﬁll the purpose of the right. The radical view rejects that
purposive interpretation can play this role. Because rights are underdetermined,
reasonable disagreements arise with respect to the protections that rights afford. A
democracy resolves such disagreements through a legislative choice that speciﬁes
what falls within a right’s scope. As one proponent of the radical view observes,
“very little is determined by the constitutional charter of rights itself. The
legislature’s construction of a right’s limitation is always contingent” and may be
“revisited by the legislature at any time that a majority of legislators see ﬁt”.77
Rights are subject to the “circumstances of politics and the legislature’s role therein
effectively leaves ‘everything up for grabs’”.78 Within the radical view, Charter
rights are not constitutional standards to which legislation must conform, but
legislative standards established through majoritarian politics.
Adopting the radical view would drastically diminish the capacity of rights to
protect their bearers. The problem with the radical view is not that legislative bodies
will invariably hollow out the protections that constitutional rights afford. This is a
contingent matter. The problem is that if the scope of a right is determined through
legislative choice, individuals will be incapable of constraining legislative activity
through their rights.79 As a critic of the radical view explains: “[E]ven if a bill of
rights stated that we have a right to a fair trial, legislation that gravely restricted the
rights of the defence would have to be regarded as necessarily compatible with and
indeed deﬁning what our rights to a fair trial are.”80 The “person deprived of
knowing the case against him . . . could not validly appeal to the fact of his right
to a fair trial having been infringed”.81 The same point applies to the earlier example
of a building code that speciﬁes what the right to life requires in a region susceptible
to earthquakes. Suppose that the legislature chooses to replace a stringent code with
a lax one that imperils human life. From the standpoint of the radical view, that code
would not necessarily infringe the right to life but would instead deﬁne the
protections that the right currently provides. Of course, a proponent of the radical
view might maintain that the legislative speciﬁcation of the right must still be
justiﬁed, but this underscores the fact that, on the radical view, constitutional rights
77
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themselves impose no direct constraint on legislative speciﬁcation. If the constitution offers individuals any protection, that protection stems not from the rights but
from the justiﬁcation analysis. I explore the ramiﬁcations of the radical view’s
approach to justiﬁcation in the next section. Presently, it is sufficient to observe that
the radical view diminishes rights-protection by empowering legislative bodies to
determine not only the mode in which their constitutional obligations may be
fulﬁlled, but the nature of the obligations themselves.
While the Frank dissent does not distinguish the purposive view of legislative
speciﬁcation from its radical counterpart, there are multiple indications that the
dissent affirms the radical view. The dissent neither refers to purposive interpretation
in general nor to the particular purpose of the right to vote. If the dissent’s view was
that the point of legislative speciﬁcation is to fulﬁll the purpose of the right to vote,
then one would expect that purpose to play some role in its account. Further, when
the dissent expounds the idea of legislative speciﬁcation, it explicitly relies on the
constitutional theory of the leading proponents of the radical view — Webber, Ekins
and Miller.82 Most signiﬁcantly, if the dissent was committed to purposive
interpretation (or some other method of conceptualizing a constitutional standard
that issued from broad rights), one could determine whether a right was infringed
prior to engaging in a section 1 justiﬁcation. However, this is exactly what the
dissent denies. On its view, a limit constitutes an infringement only if the ensuing
section 1 justiﬁcation fails.
For the dissenters, the boundary of a broad constitutional right is determined not
by the purpose of the right but by a legislative choice. However, the dissent
maintains that this does not mean that any choice is constitutional. The choice must
be justiﬁed under section 1. However, as I will now argue, the dissent’s distinctive
approach to justiﬁcation retains the terminology of Oakes but discards the
constraints to which this terminology refers. In the resulting framework, legislative
activity is constrained by neither broad Charter rights nor by the justiﬁcation
analysis.
IV. JUSTIFICATION DIMINISHED
What does it mean to justify the limitation of a Charter right?
Chief Justice Dickson’s landmark opinion in Oakes offers a familiar answer to
this question. Because Charter rights and freedoms “are part of the supreme law of
Canada”, justiﬁcation “must be premised on an understanding” that the infringement
is presumptively unconstitutional.83 Justiﬁcation is the form of legal reasoning
appropriate to the rebuttal of that presumption. Justiﬁcation is possible when the
reason for limiting the right rests in the realization of a competing constitutional
principle, or what Dickson C.J.C. terms, a pressing and substantial objective. In turn,
justiﬁcation is actual when government can establish that the realization of this
82
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principle is furthered by infringing the right (rational connection), that this principle
cannot be realized to the relevant extent through means that are less injurious of the
right (minimal impairment), and, ﬁnally, that the severity of the infringement is
justiﬁed by the “commonality of values” that underwrite both the right and the
countervailing principle.84
The guiding idea of Oakes is that justiﬁcation operates to protect rights rather than
to negate or deny them. The purpose of justiﬁcation is not to take back whatever
protections that rights afford and thereby resurrect the plenary legislative power that
preceded the entrenchment of the Charter. Rather, section 1 protects rights by
constraining the kinds of justiﬁcations that government may invoke to uphold
infringements. These constraints encompass both the end for which and the means
through which rights may be infringed. Section 1 protects rights by limiting the
limits to which rights are subject.85
The Frank dissent invokes the terminology of Oakes but offers an opposing vision
of justiﬁcation. This vision follows earlier judgments that substitute the rigor of
Oakes with deference,86 but it also goes further by disavowing the very notion of
justiﬁcation that Oakes expounds. This disavowal concerns both the precondition for
and the nature of justiﬁcation under section 1.
In Oakes, the precondition of justiﬁcation is that a supreme law right has been
infringed.87 Accordingly, the infringement is presumptively unconstitutional and
demands a justiﬁcation in which the loss to the constitutional right is offset by a
proportional gain to a competing constitutional principle. The Frank dissent does
not share this understanding. As we have seen, its organizing idea is that the ﬁnding
of an infringement is not what calls for justiﬁcation but what follows from its failure.
Thus, the dissent’s approach to section 1 proceeds on the basis that nothing of
constitutional value has been lost.
These diverging presuppositions affect the nature of the justiﬁcation that follows.
In Oakes, the extent to which the constitutional right is infringed must be
84
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compensated by the extent to which the competing principle is realized. Accordingly, the subject matter of justiﬁcation is the rightful relationship between
constitutional principles. In contrast, the Frank dissent insists that the speciﬁcation
of the right constitutes an infringement only if it is unjustiﬁed. This means that the
justiﬁcation analysis proceeds on the basis that the constitutional right has merely
been deﬁned or shaped rather than infringed or impaired.88 Since the constitutional
right remains intact, it is not the case that the law that limits it is presumptively
unconstitutional and that this presumption can be rebutted only if the state provides
“special justiﬁcation”.89 What the Frank dissenters call justiﬁcation consists in the
admonishment that courts “afford due respect to Parliament’s policy-making
expertise and to the full range of its law-making capacity”.90
While the dissent employs the term “pressing and substantial objective”,91 no
reference is made to the idea that certain kinds of considerations are capable of
denying a right but incapable of justiﬁably limiting one. The dissent explains that
statutes that limit rights need not target “an identiﬁable ‘problem’ or ‘mischief’”.92
Further, the dissent states that it is “undeniable” that “Parliament can constitutionally legislate in pursuit of, or in response to, considerations of political morality or
philosophy”.93 Similarly, Parliament “can legislate in pursuit of normative conceptions of what the Canadian political community is, and how it can best be protected
and made to ﬂourish”.94 Just as the dissent imposes no constraints on the kinds of
moral or philosophic considerations that might be invoked to limit a right, so too it
imposes no constraints on what counts as normative or conducive to ﬂourishing. The
same point applies to the dissent’s claim that the objective of legislative authority is
the common good, conceived of as “a moral choice made in response to reasons”.95
No limits on the kinds of moral claims or reasons are introduced.
The Frank dissent’s understanding of the pressing and substantial objective
requirement is worrying. Consider its similarity to the dissent issued by Belzil J.A.
of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Big M. Having eschewed a purposive interpretation of section 2(a) of the Charter, he denied that the Lord’s Day Act infringed
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freedom of religion. Turning to the legislative objective, he recognized that the
legislation was the product of “pressure from religious groups”, but maintained that
its objective was to recognize “the moral value of a day of rest. That [the civil
authority] should have selected the day of the week regarded as holy by the great
majority of Canadians is not inconsistent with the basic principles of democracy.”96
These conclusions resonate with the Frank dissent’s framework. On the one hand,
the Lord’s Day Act would be regarded as a democratic choice specifying the limit of
(rather than infringing) freedom of religion. On the other, the legislative objective
would be regarded not as denying the right, but as pursuing a moral or normative
objective relevant to notions of communal ﬂourishing. Of course, I do not claim that
the Frank dissenters regard the Lord’s Day Act as constitutional. However, what is
at issue is not their personal views but the ramiﬁcations of the framework that they
defend. To avoid Belzil J.A.’s conclusion, the Frank dissent would have to commit
itself to employing purposive interpretation and identifying legislative objectives
that are not susceptible to justiﬁcation.97
The Frank dissent’s understanding of the legislative ends for which rights may be
limited has ramiﬁcations for the ensuing analysis of legislative means. If the ends for
which rights may be limited are open-ended, then rational connection considers not
whether the means advance a competing constitutional principle, but whether they
advance whatever objective underwrites the limitation. The minimal impairment
requirement too is transformed in the hands of the dissent. With respect to minimal
impairment, Oakes asks whether there is a means of achieving the pressing and
substantial objective that is less injurious of the Charter right.98 Because the
dissent’s section 1 analysis proceeds on the basis that a right has not been infringed,
the question of whether there is a less injurious way of realizing the objective cannot
arise. Of course, one could still ask whether the right could be limited to a lesser
degree while still realizing the objective. But, as we have seen, the dissent holds that
the question of what the scope of a broadly formulated right encompasses is
determined by legislative policy rather than purposive interpretation. If the scope of
section 3 of the Charter is determined in this way, the right would be equally served
by legislation that denies the voting eligibility of certain adult citizens as by
legislation that recognizes the eligibility of all. Thus, the dissent concludes that the
residency requirement fell “within the range of reasonable options that were open to
Parliament” and insists that courts must not “second-guess” Parliamentary exercises
96
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in line-drawing.99
In the ﬁnal stage of its section 1 analysis, the dissent engages in balancing. In
Oakes, balancing concerns the relationship between constitutional principles that
cannot be jointly realized undiminished. The crucial feature of the dissent’s
balancing analysis is not the weights that it attributes to competing constitutional
principles, but the absence of constitutional principles. On the one hand, as we have
seen, the residency requirement forfeits nothing of constitutional value. While the
requirement prevents certain citizens from voting, it does not infringe their right to
vote. On the other, the right may be limited on the basis of “policy objectives”100
that are philosophical, normative, moral or tied to notions of communal ﬂourishing.
Having emptied the justiﬁcation analysis of all constitutional content, the dissent
insists that deference is appropriate: “[W]e must exercise caution to avoid usurping
Parliament’s policy-making function.”101
The dissent’s normative claim is that its approach alone takes rights seriously by
denying that the infringement of a right may be justiﬁed. Far from enhancing
rights-protection, the dissent’s proposal drastically diminishes it. Rights-protection
is not enhanced by rendering rights immune from infringement if the scope of a right
is the product of policy choices. In turn, the insistence that such choices must be
justiﬁed does not enhance rights-protection if justiﬁcation proceeds on the basis that
the right has merely been limited (as opposed to infringed) and that limit is to be
regarded as a policy choice to which courts must defer. On the framework that the
Frank dissent elaborates, persons have access to judicial review to enforce their
rights, but their rights are largely bereft of constitutional standards for judges to
enforce. In this strange constitutional world, the rhetoric of constitutional rights
persists, but protection from legislative bodies evaporates.
V. CONCLUSION
The central problem in the Frank dissent can be explicated in the terms of a
section 1 analysis. The dissent’s objective of introducing a framework that is both
faithful to constitutional text and committed to clarifying our understanding of how
Charter rights protect persons from state power is pressing and substantial.
However, the framework that the dissent elaborates is not rationally connected to
this objective. The proposal is not faithful to constitutional text because its
inconclusive claims about section 1 commit it to ignoring text found in section 24.
As for the normative argument, the proposal fails to enhance rights-protection
because it conceives of the boundary of rights as reﬂecting policy choices to which
courts must defer rather than constitutional standards that courts must enforce.
Within such a framework, rights may not be infringed, but they offer their bearers
no more protection than legislative bodies happen to confer. Far from enhancing
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rights-protection, the dissent’s proposal would resurrect the very problem that the
entrenchment of the Charter was designed to address.
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